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A R B I T R A T I O N

When Do Federal Courts Have
Jurisdiction to Review Petitions
to Compel Arbitration?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 37–41. © 2008 American Bar Association.

However, Vaden’s credit card statements identified her as a regular
card member until September 1999.
In July 1999, Discover mailed Vaden
a “Notice of Amendment to
Discover Platinum Cardmember
Agreement.” This notice, which
applied only to Platinum Card members, included a provision requiring
arbitration of disputes.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Professor Grenig is the author of
Alternative Dispute Resolution,
published by Thomson
Reuters/West and is a member
of the National Academy
of Arbitrators. He can be reached
at jgrenig@earthlink.net
or (414) 288-5377.

In July 2003, DFS sued Vaden on
behalf of Discover Bank in Maryland
state court for nonpayment of a
card balance in excess of $10,000.
Vaden then filed class-action counterclaims against DFS based solely
on Maryland law. These counterclaims include a breach-of-contract
claim and claims that certain fees
and interest rates were charged in
violation of applicable Maryland
statutes regulating finance charges,
late fees, and compounding of interest on consumer credit accounts. In
that proceeding, DFS was identified
as “Discover Financial Services, Inc.
(Discover), SVC Affiliate of Discover
Bank, F/K/A Greenwood Trust Co., a
DE chartered state bank and issuer
of the Discover Card.”

ISSUE
Does a U.S. district court have subject-matter jurisdiction over a petition seeking to compel arbitration of
a state-court defendant’s counterclaims, when the counterclaims are
completely preempted by federal
banking law?

FACTS
In 1990, Betty Vaden, a Maryland
resident, obtained a Discover credit
card from Discover Bank, a
Delaware-chartered, federally
insured bank. According to a servicing agreement between Discover
Financial Services (DFS) and
Discover Bank, DFS performs functions such as marketing and servicing Discover Bank loan products
and collecting on accounts pursuant
to instructions from Discover Bank.
In June 1999, Discover mailed
Vaden a new Platinum Discover
Card. Discover claimed Vaden’s
account was automatically converted to Platinum status at this time.

(Continued on Page 38)

VADEN V. DISCOVER BANK
DOCKET NO. 07-773
ARGUMENT DATE:
OCTOBER 6, 2008
FROM: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
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Case
at a
Glance
Discover Financial
Services, an affiliate of
Discover Bank, sued
Betty Valden in state
court for her unpaid
credit card balance. She
responded with class
action counterclaims
against Discover
Financial Services that
were based on state law,
but preempted by federal
law. Discover then filed
suit in federal district
court seeking to compel
Vaden to submit her
counterclaims to
arbitration. The question
now is whether the
federal district court has
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Discover’s
petition to compel
arbitration.

Shortly after Vaden filed her counterclaims, Discover filed a petition
in federal court seeking to compel
arbitration of Vaden’s state-court
counterclaims based on the arbitration provision in the Notice of
Amendment. Discover had made
no previous requests to Vaden for
arbitration. The district court
granted Discover’s motion to
compel arbitration.
Vaden appealed the district court’s
decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In
January 2005, the Fourth Circuit
considered the issue of whether the
federal courts had subject-matter
jurisdiction to decide this case. The
court held that, “when a party
comes to federal court seeking to
compel arbitration, the presence of
a federal question in the underlying
dispute is sufficient to support subject-matter jurisdiction.” Discover
Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 367
(4th Cir. 2005). The court declined,
however, to decide whether such an
underlying federal question actually
existed in this case. Instead, it
directed the district court to determine whether a federal question
existed and to examine whether
Discover Bank was the “real party
in interest” with respect to Vaden’s
state-court claims and whether
these claims were completely preempted by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.
The district court found that
Discover Bank was the real party in
interest and that Vaden’s state-court
usury claims were completely preempted by federal law. The district
court also found that there was no
issue of material fact regarding the
existence of an arbitration agreement between Vaden and Discover
Bank. Accordingly, it granted
Discover’s request for arbitration.
Discover Bank v. Vaden, 409 F.
Supp. 2d 632 (D. Md. 2006).

Vaden again appealed the district
court’s ruling to the Fourth Circuit.
Vaden argued that DFS was the real
party in interest, and thus that the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act was
not implicated and the federal court
was without subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. Vaden also
contended that compelling arbitration was improper for two reasons:
(1) Discover lacked standing
because it had failed to satisfy the
relevant statutory requirements for
compelling arbitration, and (2)
there was no valid arbitration agreement between Vaden and Discover
Bank.
Affirming the district court’s decision, a majority of the three-judge
Fourth Circuit panel held that (1)
the bank, not the servicing affiliate,
was the real party in interest on the
counterclaims; (2) state-law usury
claims against a state-chartered,
federally insured bank are preempted by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act; (3) Vaden’s claims for violation
of state laws regulating finance
charges, late fees, and interest
involved usury charges under the
Federal Deposit Insurance and thus
were completely preempted; and (4)
complete preemption of usury
claims sufficed to provide a federal
forum for proceeding to compel
arbitration of all claims within the
arbitration agreement.
Vaden argued that she had not
refused to arbitrate because
Discover did not request arbitration
with her before it filed suit. The
Fourth Circuit, however, found that
Discover had “standing” to file a
petition to compel arbitration
because Vaden had counterclaimed
in state court and taken two appeals
“to avoid arbitration of her claims.”
Discover Bank v. Vaden, 489 F.3d
594 (4th Cir. 2007).
The dissenting judge asserted that
the majority had inexplicably used

38

the removal doctrine of complete
preemption to characterize a counterclaim in a state court civil action
as “federal.” The dissent contended
that federal question jurisdiction
cannot be predicated on federal
issues that may arise later in an
action by way of defense or
counterclaim.
Vaden’s request for review was
granted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
128 S.Ct. 1651 (2008).

CASE ANALYSIS
Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) provides that “[a] party
aggrieved by the alleged failure,
neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement
for arbitration may petition any
United States district court which,
save for such agreement, would
have jurisdiction under title 28 …
for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner
provided for in such agreement.”
With respect to subject-matter jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides
that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.”
According to Vaden, the Federal
Arbitration Act does not allow a
court to order arbitration simply
because it finds one party in breach
of an arbitration agreement. In this
case, Vaden argues, the Fourth
Circuit’s analysis focused on the
wrong statute. She notes that in
finding it had jurisdiction based on
language in Section 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, the Fourth Circuit
made little attempt to square its ruling with 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or
decades of case law interpreting that
provision. Vaden suggests that,
under those precedents, an action
seeking to enforce an ordinary arbitration provision does not arise
under federal law, even if the Act
might displace an otherwise avail-
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able state-law defense. She claims
the Fourth Circuit’s decision
impliedly repealed the “well-pleaded
complaint” rule, which states that
for a federal court to have jurisdiction over a case “arising under” federal law, it must be clear from the
face of the complaint that there is a
federal question.
Discover disagrees, claiming the language in Section 4 is plain and
unambiguous. It is Discover’s position that Section 4 grants federal
courts jurisdiction to compel arbitration, but only if, after putting to
one side the arbitration agreement,
the court concludes that it would
have jurisdiction over a suit arising
out of the controversy between the
parties. Because the underlying controversy over the legality of interest
payments and other fees by
Discover Bank was completely preempted and solely based on federal
law, Vaden contends the district
court properly exercised jurisdiction
to compel arbitration.

counterclaim, but permits jurisdiction based on a completely preempted state-law counterclaim.
Discover responds that, through
Section 4, Congress provided a federal court vehicle for the effective
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, even when there is no pending litigation in the district court.
Relying on cases involving complete
preemption by federal law, Discover
argues that the well-pleaded complaint rule did not preclude it from
petitioning a United States district
court to compel arbitration. As long
as a party is “aggrieved by the
alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of
another to arbitrate” and the district court “would have jurisdiction”
over a “suit arising out of the controversy between the parties,” the
district court has the power and
duty to compel arbitration.

Discover further claims that “the
peculiar procedural posture of this
case—that the parties’ federal
dispute first was revealed in a
counterclaim filed in Maryland state
court—should make no difference
under Section 4.…” Discover
observes that Section 4 is designed
to address the situation in which a
party neglects or refuses to arbitrate
a dispute, including cases in which
no complaint has been filed at all.
According to Discover, the fact that
Vaden’s refusal to arbitrate was
reflected in counterclaims filed in
state court does not deprive the
district court of jurisdiction to
address Discover’s petition to
compel arbitration.

Discover asserts that an interpretation of Section 4 preventing the district court from “looking through”
the petition to the parties’ underlying dispute, would both violate the
language of Section 4 and subvert
Congress’s goals under the Federal
Arbitration Act. According to
Discover, an examination required
in looking through the petition to
the underlying dispute is little different from the analysis required to
assess whether the dispute falls
within the scope of the Federal
Arbitration Act and the parties’
arbitration agreement. Discover
argues that Vaden does not advance
any basis for her position that district courts may “look through” to
the underlying controversy in
assessing the amount in controversy
in diversity cases, but may not do
so in federal question cases.

Vaden argues that it makes no sense
to assert that the well-pleaded complaint rule precludes a federal court
from basing Section 1331 federal
question jurisdiction on a federal

Vaden, however, argues that looking
through the petition to the underlying dispute takes no account of
what federal jurisdiction typically
treats as central: the rightful inter-

est of states. She says Discover’s
theory would allow a federal court
to assert jurisdiction based on a
hypothetical lawsuit even when the
parties were litigating an actual
lawsuit in state court over which
the federal court could not assert
jurisdiction.
Discover also notes that federal
question jurisdiction exists in a
declaratory judgment action if the
potential suit by the declaratory
judgment defendant would arise
under federal law. Vaden, however,
rejects this analogy between Section
4 and the Declaratory Judgment
Act. She contends that, unlike a
declaratory judgment action, neither a Section 4 petition nor the
response to it asks the court to
resolve any federal question, and
the court therefore cannot reach
the merits of the underlying dispute
in which any federal question is
embedded. Discover responds that,
in deciding a petition under Section
4, a court necessarily determines
whether a party has been aggrieved
by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate under
a written agreement for arbitration.
Although the district court does not
resolve the underlying dispute for
which arbitration is sought,
Discover says that is necessarily the
case under Section 4, where the
relief sought is enforcement of a federal right to compel arbitration.
Vaden also concludes that Discover’s
alleged lack of standing is an alternative ground for reversing the
Fourth Circuit. Arguing that
Discover filed its Section 4 petition
in federal court when Vaden was not
even arguably in breach of the
alleged arbitration agreement,
Vaden contends Discover did not
establish an “injury in fact”—an
indispensable prerequisite to having
standing to file suit. Vaden points
out that the contract allowed
Discover to “elect to resolve [a cov(Continued on Page 40)
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ered] claim or dispute by binding
arbitration.” Claiming that arbitration was not mandatory under the
agreement, Vaden reasons that litigating her claim could not itself
constitute “neglect” of any legal
obligation.
Disagreeing with Vaden, Discover
argues that the Court need not and
should not address the “new” issue
of standing, which Discover asserts
is procedurally improper and substantively meritless.

SIGNIFICANCE
Congress enacted the Federal
Arbitration Act in 1925 to replace
judicial indisposition to arbitration
with a “national policy favoring it
and placing arbitration agreements
on equal footing with all other contracts.” Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443
(2006). Section 2 of the Act makes
written arbitration agreements “in
any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce … valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any
contract.”
If no lawsuit is pending, a petition
(rather than a motion) to compel
arbitration is filed in order to commence the proceeding. The petition
is filed in a court that would have
jurisdiction over an action involving
the dispute and that has personal
jurisdiction over the parties. In a
proceeding to compel arbitration
under Section 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, the court determines whether there is an arbitration agreement covered by the
Federal Arbitration Act and if so,
whether the respondent has failed,
neglected, or refused to fulfill it.
Once satisfied that an agreement for
arbitration exists and has not been
honored, the court must order arbi-

tration. See Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395,
400 (1967).
In this case, the Supreme Court
must determine whether the federal
courts had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Discover’s Section 4
proceeding to compel arbitration of
Vaden’s counterclaims. In earlier
cases, the Supreme Court has held
that the Federal Arbitration Act,
standing alone, does not provide a
basis for federal jurisdiction. See
e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984) (stating
the Court did not believe Congress
intended to limit the Act to disputes
subject only to federal court jurisdiction because that would frustrate
congressional intent to place arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts). Rather,
the Supreme Court has said that
“[a]s for jurisdiction over controversies touching arbitration, the Act
does nothing, being ‘something of an
anomaly in the field of federal-court
jurisdiction’ in bestowing no federal
jurisdiction but rather requiring an
independent jurisdictional basis.”
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402
(2008), quoting Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)
(holding federal courts’ jurisdiction
to enforce Act is concurrent with
that of state courts).
In Hall, the Supreme Court stated it
was relying, in part, on 9 U.S.C. § 4,
which provides for action by a federal district court, “which, save for
such [arbitration agreement] would
have jurisdiction under title 28.”
The Court further explained that
“[b]ecause the FAA is not jurisdictional, there is no merit in the argument that enforcing the arbitration
agreement’s judicial review provision would create federal jurisdiction by private contract.”
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The Court in Moses H. Cone stated:
“Section 4 provides for an order
compelling arbitration only when
the federal district court would have
jurisdiction over a suit on the
underlying dispute; hence, there
must be diversity of citizenship or
some other independent basis for
jurisdiction before the order can
issue.” However, the Court also stated that, “although enforcement of
the Act is left in large part to the
state courts, it nevertheless represents federal policy to be vindicated
by the federal courts where otherwise appropriate.”
Normally, for a federal court to have
jurisdiction over a case “arising
under” federal law (28 U.S.C.
§ 1331), it must be clear from the
face of a well-pleaded complaint
that there is a federal question. A
federal right must be an essential
element of the plaintiff’s claim; the
controversy must be disclosed upon
the face of the complaint, unaided
by the answer or by the petition for
removal. In a patent case, the
Supreme Court held that the wellpleaded-complaint rule does not
allow a counterclaim to serve as
the basis for a district court’s
“arising under” jurisdiction to hear
all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. Even when a complaint alleges only violations of
state law, the Supreme Court has
explained that the case may nevertheless center on a federal question
and therefore be removable from
state court to federal court if federal
law completely preempts the state
law claims. Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
The courts of appeals disagree
whether—in a proceeding to compel
arbitration—a district court has
subject-matter jurisdiction over a
case when the underlying dispute
between the parties raises a federal
question. Compare Westmoreland
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Capital Corp. v. Findlay, 100 F.3d
263 (2d Cir.1996) with Tamiami
Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe,
177 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir.1999). The
narrower view, known as the
Westmoreland doctrine, echoes the
well-pleaded complaint rule. This
doctrine holds that, for a district
court to have federal question jurisdiction over a suit compelling arbitration, the federal question must be
evident on the face of the arbitration petition itself. Perhaps realizing
that such a possibility is highly
unlikely, the Westmoreland line of
cases concludes that federal question jurisdiction will never form the
basis for a court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear a Section 4 petition. Under this view, jurisdiction
will lie only when some other basis
for federal jurisdiction exists, such
as diversity of citizenship or assertion of a claim in admiralty, but will
not lie simply because the underlying controversy between the parties
raises a federal question.
The broader view, as set forth in
Tamiami, permits a federal court to
examine the underlying dispute
between the parties to determine if
a federal question is present. Under
this view, a district court is permitted to “look through” the arbitration
request to assess whether the overall controversy between the parties
is grounded in federal law. Other
circuits have disagreed with the
Fourth Circuit and interpreted
Section 4 to mean that a federal
court does not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over an action to compel or stay arbitration merely
because the underlying claim raises
a federal question.

financial institutions and others
seeking to compel arbitration to get
into federal court.

ATTORNEYS
PARTIES

FOR THE

For Petitioner Betty E. Vaden
(John A. Mattingly, Jr. (301) 4757000).
For Respondent Discover Bank
(Carter G. Phillips (202) 736-8000)

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Respondent Discover
Bank
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States and CITA—The
Wireless Association (Evan M. Tager
(202) 263-3000)
Cintas Corporation (Mark C.
Dosker (415) 954-0200)
Financial Services Roundtable,
Consumer Bankers Association,
American Financial Services
Association, American Bankers
Association, and Maryland Bankers
Association (Seth M. Galanter (202)
887-1544)
Law Professors (Imre S. Szalai
(619) 525-1493)

The Supreme Court is called upon
to resolve this disagreement among
the circuits. A decision in Vaden’s
favor would reduce the number of
petitions to compel arbitration filed
in federal court. A ruling for
Discover, would make it easier for
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